企业管理dissertation：代理成本和所有权结构的管理行为

1. Introduction
1.1. in thd encomy Environment within the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of householdership structure1 for the firm. along with tying together elements of the idea of eachof those three areas, our researchcasts new gentleon and has implications for a number of issues within the proand dadular literature including the definition of the firm, the “separation of householdership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the preciseation of the content of credit agreements, the idea of rganizations, and the sourceside of the entireness of markets problems.
1。介绍
1.1。在本文中，我们得出的理论财产权利（1），（2）机构，以及（3）金融发展的理论在公司内的最新进展。随着运算这三个领域，我们新的想法元素捆绑在一起，并具有影响的一些问题内文献，包括该公司的定义，“分离的控制，”“社会责任“的经营，”企业的目标函数的定义，“最佳资本结构的确定，内容的信贷协议，的想法组织行为学的整个市场问题的。

1.2 Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?
While the literature of economics is replete with references to the “theory of the firm,”the material generally subsumed under that heading is not actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however, we have no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. The limitations of this black box view of the firm have been cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. More recently, popular and
professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” have evidenced continuing concern with these issues.
1.2企业理论：一个空框？
虽然经济学的文献中充斥着“企业理论的引用，”的材料一般归入该标题是不是实际上是一个企业理论，而是理论的市场中，企业是重要的参与者。该公司是一个“黑箱”操作，以满足相关的投入和产出的边际条件，从而实现利润最大化，或者更准确地说，现值。除了最近的一些试探性步骤，但是，我们有没有理论解释如何个别参与者被带入平衡相互冲突的目标，从而产生这样的结果的。这个黑盒子的局限性，鉴于公司已被引用的亚当·斯密和阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔，等等。最近，流行，
专业争论的“社会责任”的企业，所有权和控制权的分离，而且皮疹文学上的“理论”已经证明这些问题的持续关注公司的评论。

1.3 Property Rights
An independent stream of research with important implications for the theory of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others.5 A comprehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). While the focus of this research has been “property rights”,6 the subject matter encompassed is far broader than that term suggests. What is important for the problems addressed here is that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated among the participants in any organization. Since the specification of rights is generally affected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts. We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.

Note also that agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort (such as the coauthoring of this paper) by two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. Viewed in this light it is clear that our definition of agency costs and their importance
to the theory of the firm bears a close relationship to the problem of shirking and monitoring of team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise in their paper on the theory of the firm. Since the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits the
definition of a pure agency relationship, it should come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the “separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency. We show below that an
explanation of why and how the agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.

governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these situations
(where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally. We confine our attention in this paper to only a small part of this general problem—the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the owners and top management of the corporation.

Conclusions
The publicly held business corporation is an awesome social invention. Millions of individuals voluntarily entrust billions of dollars, francs, pesos, etc. of personal wealth to the care of managers on the basis of a complex set of contracting relationships which delineate the rights of the parties involved. The growth in the use of the corporate form as well as the growth in market value of established corporations suggests that at least, up to the present, creditors and investors have by and large not been disappointed with the results, despite the agency costs inherent in the corporate form.