银行监管理论发展：Banking regulation theory development
文摘:银行业是最基本和最重要的金融机构,但它也是最容易引起系统的危机的一个机构。在如何确保银行业稳定运行方面,经济学家和银行家认为对于银行业监管的责任是非常重要的。为了防范和化解金融风险,确保银行业稳定运行,自1970年代以来,国际经济组织和各国政府推出了很多关于银行监管政策,系统和协议,经济学家也为银行监管问题的研究和探索,并取得丰硕成果。
前言
近年来,这一领域的理论和实践越来越引起中国的经济学家和金融学者的兴趣和关注。尤其是过去三年中国银行业监督管理 委员会(银监会)，在勇气和智慧上打开中国银行监管新局面，已经基本完成了具备国际视野的制度框架建设工作，进行了探索和创新,为中国银行监管理论的形成和发展奠定 了基础.
Abstract: the banking sector is the most basic and the most important financial institutions, but it is also the most likely to cause a system crisis of the department. In terms of how to ensure stable operation to the banking sector, economists and bankers agree that the responsibility of banking regulation is very significant. To guard against and defuse financial risks, ensure stable operation to the banking sector, since the 1970 s, the international economic organizations and governments introduced a lot about the banking regulatory policy, system and protocol, economists also hard for banking regulation problem of research and exploration, and achieved fruitful results.
preface
In recent years, the theory and practice of this field is increasingly caused the economist and financial scholars of China's interest and attention. Especially the past three years the China banking regulatory commission (CBRC), on the courage and wisdom to open a new situation of China's banking regulation, has been basically completed a work of the construction of the institutional framework with international vision, the exploration and innovation, more the formation and development of Chinese banking supervision theory laid a foundation.
In order to further promote the combination of contemporary bank regulation theory and local practice, accelerate the construction of China's banking regulation theory and the summary, the frontiers of the theory in current weekly specially invited two experts wrote from different angles on banking regulation theory is introduced.
Dr Yan Qingmin, a former director of the China banking regulatory commission (CBRC) a bank regulation, published studies of the China banking regulatory problems, the research on Chinese banking risk assessment and early warning system, etc. A number of monographs. He think: in general, the modern financial theory to study presents both differentiation and the development trend of integrated, this behaves particularly outstandingly in banking regulation problem research. On the one hand, bank regulation research object is more and more sophisticated, research scope from the original to prevent bank runs, to the subsequent financial regulation until now the bank's risk supervision. For development to the present, the problem bank regulation has differentiation and table, functional regulation, cross-border supervision regulation and elastic regulation and so on many research fields. But on the other hand, bank regulation is not like other economics (such as the theories of economic growth, inflation, exchange rate, interest rate theory, market failure theory, etc.) as an independent and complete theoretical system, a large number of theoretical point of view, methods and ideas are scattered in various types of literature, for this particular problem. In this case, bank regulation research and other areas of the economy comprehensive, cross and penetration phenomenon appeared, the theory of social interests, George j. stigler, control theory, admire her price decision model, posner management theory, American economist Edward Kane's dialectics of control theory and many other emerging economics theory and method were transplanted in the study of regulation of Banks, department of some other economic control, such as telecommunications, railway research method and case study have also been introduced into the banking regulation, the popularity of western economics since the 1960 s, linear programming, game theory and econometrics is a revolutionary influence on banking regulation research.
It is based on the above research methods, theoretical studied the economic causes of banking regulation. Economists from different angles, proposed the theory of many regulatory or from the reason of regulation, have a plenty of starting from the actual effect of regulation, have a plenty of starting from the mechanism of supervision, the emphasis of the different form the financial market failure theory, the collapse of the financial and social market theory, government theory of plunder, special interests and the theory of multivariate interests theory, etc. Dr Yan Qingmin by contemporary the development of the theory of banking supervision is for us to interpret the essence of the representative theory.
Dr Pan Wenbo from banking regulation on the line, for China's banking supervision work to explore the efforts of the standardization, specialization and internationalization has practical experience, he through the bank of China, the new development of regulation theory and practice "article shows the CBRC and its dispatched institutions of supervision system, the ways and means innovation effective attempt.
At the start of the New Year, we launched this article, in the hope that after the establishment of the China banking regulatory commission (CBRC) third anniversary eve, more and more scholars and practical workers to join bank regulation theory research. Believe that with the help of international vision and the double advantage of local resources, according to China's banking supervision theory can be the forefront of the financial research. (xin-xin jiang)
The development of the theory of modern banking supervision 现代银行监管的理论的发展
Under the condition of modern market economy, the commercial bank is the most important channels to obtain external finance. Gayle and shaw, emphasized that the bank to the borrower need long-term credit portfolios into short-term deposit combinations, reduced the transaction cost. Therefore, governments to give attaches great importance to the banking supervision. But for why banking regulation, the effect of regulation is what? Economists proposed many regulatory theory from different angles.
Financial market failure 金融市场失灵
"The new palgrave economics dictionary explanation of" control "is: control is the price of the government to control enterprise, sales and production decisions and all kinds of action, the government is trying to stop these actions publicly announced don't pay attention to the private decisions of social interest. Financial regulation, an economist at the economic control theory application, think that there is no information under the premise of cost or the transaction cost is very low, the government of powerful supervision can improve the bank's corporate governance, so as to improve the public interest of society as a whole, to maximize the social welfare level, realize the pareto optimality. This theory is known as the public interest theory, otherwise known as the official supervision point of view, the policy implication is that the private sector in general lack of relevant information, power and ability to monitor enterprises and institutions, therefore, urgent need a powerful government agency to monitor Banks.
(1) market failure
Implicit in the public interest theory of the economics behind the phenomenon is the financial market failure. Western economists believe that information asymmetry is the main cause of market failure. Due to the lack of information on the financial system of the problem may occur in two phases: before and after trading, resulting in the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Adverse selection is caused by information asymmetry problem before trading. Adverse selection in financial markets refers to: those who are most likely to cause adverse (reverse) that caused the credit risk of the borrowers, often is the most actively looking for a loan, so it is most likely to get a loan. Risk, for example, companies or fraudsters are often the most actively seeking a loan. Can cause the credit risk adverse selection makes loans, lenders may decide not to issue any loans, even if there are small selection of credit risk in the market. Moral hazard is after the transaction caused by asymmetric information problem. Moral hazard in financial markets refers to: borrowers may be engaged in from the lenders point of view does not want its to be engaged in the risk of activities, because these activities are likely to make these loans cannot be returned. For example, is due to the use of other people's money, the borrower may originally used in the production of loans to invest in high risk of stock market in order to get high yield. Due to the risk of moral hazard reduce the possibility of a return loan, loan borrowers may decide to prefer not to do.
(2) of the externalities of the banking crisis
External effects of the banking crisis is also a government regulated Banks an important reason. External effect is the most important characteristics of there is a concern, but not on the market for sale "goods". Microeconomics has proved that the existence of external effects to achieve optimal distribution of social resources can't and affect the efficiency of economic operation. Information asymmetry may also lead to financial institutions widely collapse, produce the financial panic. Due to financial institutions to provide funds of the depositors could not clear whether the operation of financial institutions is moderate, therefore, once the suspicious of financial institutions operating conditions occur, will appear "contagion effect" and "flock effect", a single bank risk problem or failure is easy to produce a chain reaction and the systemic risk of Banks, the good and bad Banks, which make the huge losses to the public, and cause serious blow to the economy as a whole. In the modern financial system, financial institutions, financial characteristics of high leverage, also makes the external effect is more apparent.
(3) the imperfection of the law
Real society is changing and the legal stability, at the beginning of law do not completely reflect changes in the later, is the inconsistency of the time. Therefore, the law has not completeness, is unlikely to be optimal. And if people know what the limits of the law, will take advantage of loopholes of law, the law has lost the most optimal deterrent effect. Because the court must be neutral, can not become active law enforcers, because law enforcement means that law enforcers must actively in the case, to have their own position. Therefore, we need to have a phase separation of institutions with the court, namely "regulator". From the function, the court and the difference of regulators, the court of law enforcement is passive, law enforcement only after the appeal, the regulation is an active way of law enforcement, can be harmful consequences or event occurs before the surveillance, investigation, or even to stop a particular behavior. As a result, the law does not complete the introduction of regulators to active law enforcement can improve law enforcement effect. Regulation is a government behavior, different courts.
(4) the coase theorem
According to the coase theorem, if there is no transaction cost, as long as there is the court to perform the contract, don't need other agencies - the government, regulators, and so on. By the key of coase theorem, the possibility of hypothesis is effective to perform complex in accordance with the contract. A judge must be able to read these complex, more important is willing to contract, special terms and conditions of the contract facts to verify whether really happened, and explain the general and vague language. The judge should be in accordance with the applicable law, more need to do this, applicable to the interpretation of the regulations, rules and even need to put in more effort. In fact, many countries lack of funding, the court judges lack of power, don't know how to apply the law, not familiar with economic problems, even corruption.By the judge is a kind of alternative strategies for implementation of the law enforcement by regulators. Judges and regulators the key difference is that the latter is more likely to have to punish the offender's motivation. Due to the transition of the judicial system of low efficiency and backward compared with developed market economy countries, verify the specific case and cost a lot to explain the rule of law, the judge may not be enough incentive to law enforcement. Regulators, law enforcement has a powerful incentive and tendentiousness, may be able to more effectively protect property rights. It had not been fully organized interest groups, and independence is strong, policymakers are very concerned about the public interest, regulators can implement the prudent supervision, supervision law enforcement is more powerful in this case. Therefore, in terms of solution to market failure, government regulation become inefficient alternative ways of judicial procedure.
(5) the financial constraints
Renowned economist Joseph stiglitz and others from the perspective of "financial restraint" is the government's bank market access control provides a new analysis framework. They believe that governments in developing countries of two important goal is to improve the stability of the financial sector, establish incentive mechanism in order to make high quality of financial institutions to develop. Limit the competition of the banking, maintaining the profitability of the banking sector to maintain its "franchise value" (that is, the value of the business license), can enhance the security of financial system, it is important for the economy as a whole is external effect. In order to regulate the banking industry competition, the government needs to control into to the banking sector. Too much to get in the way most of the competitors to achieve an effective scale, thus weakening their ability and willingness to long-term investment, the overall quality of the deterioration in Banks.
Of course, in addition to restrict market access, financial constraints, the relevant policy is to prevent excessive competition of the existing banking institutions, excessive competition or ineffective competition will only lead to the waste of social resources, resulting in a loss of Banks "franchise value" and the decline of the safety of the banking system. In addition, there is an important financial restraint policy is a policy restricting the use of alternative assets, namely the restriction will deposit into other assets in the banking system. Otherwise, it will lead to a drop in bank system capital, decline in profitability. This relates to the development of capital market.
The collapse of the financial and social marketing theory 崩溃的金融和社会营销理论
The theory is that because of the particularity of the banking sector, the Banks in the financial markets faced by inadequate information, information asymmetry, public goods, increasing economies of scale, monopoly and externality will not only lead to problems such as local "market failure", and can lead to a social "economic collapse," the financial system has strong information asymmetry and uncertainty, these factors make it has strong instability, and by interfering with the country's money supply mechanism and credit mechanism, a strong impact on the real economy, and due to the effect of amplification of the financial system, will lead to the impact with devastating effects. Countries should, therefore, the comprehensive control on the banking industry.
Financial market failure and the theory of financial and social collapse market in essence is consistent, emphasize the rationality of the financial regulation, basically is to build the framework of new classical economics theory, and assume that the state and other regulatory body has the ability of regulation, and their goals are consistent with social interests. Therefore, these two theory formed the basis of mainstream economists banking regulation theory. In the ideal world of walras, all financial institutions can reach peak form for the efficient allocation of financial resources.
The government theory of plunder 政府掠夺的理论
"Political/regulatory capture theory" is contrary to the public interest theory of another kind of regulation theory, public interest theory is discussed from the perspective of empirical reality. The theory is that financial regulators politicians (regulators) in supervision work is not to maximize the welfare of society as a whole, but to maximize the welfare of the individual. So, politicians (regulators) often will bank transfer to the enterprises related to political, rather than the general social enterprise; Or power larger Banks will be able to "capture" politicians (regulators), induction of bank regulators in the interests of the bank, not in the best interests of society as a starting point for regulation. This view is supported by many empirical studies. Empirical studies show that look from actual effect, the results of bank official regulation is to reduce the bank efficiency of allocation of social resources, in particular, if the power of a government regulators, and even affects the general public and enterprise ability to obtain credit funds. In other words, market failure is the necessity of the government regulation, but the political/regulatory capture theory emphasizes is the possibility of government failure.
For this reason, economists exploring market failure which is the excuse of government intervention and government failure (that means government regulation is not necessarily can solve the problem of market failure) at the same time there are a lot of research on the mechanism of aspects. Someone is put forward, in order to solve this problem need to establish a scientific mechanism, which can avoid the government regulation "the hand of plunder", at the same time can improve the welfare of society as a whole, also is the use of "hand" support of the government. We can be known as the "balance theory". Someone proposed that under the appropriate incentive mechanism, the establishment of an independent bank regulators may be solutions to government failure and market failure. The agency is not only independent of government, and shall be independent from the bank, can not only overcome the information asymmetry, and avoid being captured by bank.
Special interests and the theory of multiple interests 特殊利益集团和多个利益理论
In recent years, economists should further strengthen the private (creditor) on bank supervision, because private (creditors) quantity is numerous, compared with the single government regulators, it is difficult to be captured by the Banks or the government. Policy significance of the theory is that the banking regulation strategy should be through strengthen disclosure requirements for Banks, private (creditor) to get information, the cost of processing information, to improve their motivation and ability to supervise bank; At the same time, limit the power of the government regulators, in order to prevent the use of bank to achieve a specific political purpose. Economists also observed, with the aid of the private sector (creditor) supervise Banks must pay attention to set up a scientific system of deposit insurance, if the deposit insurance system established by the government of a country is too generous, will greatly reduce the private (creditor) motivation of bank supervision. In addition, due to the "free-rider" phenomenon exist in reality, use a depositors to monitor Banks imagine it is difficult to achieve in theory to actual effect.
In private regulation, some people think that can be made by Banks on behalf of the savers from private insurance companies (not like America's federal deposit insurance corporation) deposit insurance, they think that private insurance companies have more power than the government's deposit insurance corporation to accurately measure the risk of bank and collect the premium accordingly. Advocates of private insurance companies, of course, is not advocating a complete elimination of public regulation. But against this view believe that the idea for private deposit insurance company ignored the systemic risks of banking industry. Due to the external effect of the banking crisis, under the impact of the macroeconomic, even the capital adequacy of Banks will lose solvency. Finally, the government had to come forward as a lender of last resort, to the banking sector into a large amount of public funds.
In real life, because most of the creditor bank, understanding of the operating conditions of Banks is less, especially the depositors, bank of lack of professional knowledge of non-financial corporations, exposed to the risk that the creditors, under the condition of no deposit insurance system, are more likely to have bank accounts. Therefore, to establish or Ming or dark deposit insurance system is a relatively good institutional arrangements. Of course, does not reject the supervision of Banks and other large creditors such as the supervision of the subordinated debt holders to bank.
The debate on banking regulation in spite of the above, but a typical bank regulation or by the public sector. There are two ways to public regulation: camera supervision and regulation of the camera. Camera regulation is when reduced to a point when the solvency of Banks, regulators have camera power to control the bank. The camera regulation is when regulators to gain control of the bank, after regulators may be sold or bank liquidation. At the same time, if a bank's shareholders want to increase the equity investment, shareholders can regain control of the bank. In general, the lower bank solvency, shareholders to retain control of the cost is higher, the management is the greater the likelihood of intervention.
In general, the theory of banking supervision is one of the forefront of modern economics theory. Economists study of regulatory issues is becoming more and more attention, but to this day, did not form a unified and complete theoretical system. As people's emphasis on regulatory issues, I believe there will be more research results come out.
The new development of China's banking supervision theory and practice 中国银行监管理论和实践的最新发展
Modern finance theory is that: "the banking regulation is nothing more than general public regulation theory in the application of the modern banking". The China banking regulatory commission (CBRC) and its dispatched institutions, as the representative of the government shoulders the responsibility of banking supervision. Over the past three years, the China banking regulatory commission system of supervision system, ways and means innovation, vigorously promote the banking regulation theory and practice of new development.
From the point of view of the risk supervision, capital is a buffer, capital height related directly to the bank to take risks and to resist the ability of the unexpected loss, which is particularly important to the Banks themselves. So-called regulatory capital, namely regulatory rules Banks must have a minimum capital, consists of a core capital and subsidiary capital. Regulatory capital adequacy ratio of core to make and take a series of regulatory standards, methods and actions referred to as regulatory capital. On banking regulatory capital now became one of the core content of prudential supervision.
Since 1996 in our country has implemented regulatory capital, but in many ways with the international standard gap is bigger, seriously overvalued the capital adequacy ratio, in addition, the bank capital adequacy ratio is low, also not clear regulation. In comprehensive reference to the new and the old Basel capital accord under the premise of the beginning of 2004, the China banking regulatory commission issued the "commercial bank capital adequacy ratio management method", marked the our country banking regulatory capital had the new breakthrough.
For two years, the way to determine the capital constraint mechanism play an important role. More on the one hand, the bank's capital constraints, are "molecules" and "denominator" strategy, by urging shareholders capital injection, adjust the asset structure, improve the operating conditions, the introduction of strategic investors, qualified to issue long-term subordinated bonds, convertible bonds, public or private placements in a variety of ways, such as supplementary capital. On the other hand, the China banking regulatory commission to strengthen the supervision of capital adequacy. By late 2005, capital adequacy ratio reached 8% of the bank has reached 40, standard bank assets accounted for about 73%. Starting from the reality of our country, the China banking regulatory commission in the future the basic strategies for implementation of the new capital accord in China's banking industry to "two-step" and "double track", actively encourage large domestic Banks to speed up the internal rating system construction, enhance the level of risk management.
Throughout the evolution of international banking regulation mode, which can be clearly identified trajectory that is compliance regulation stage. - whether on financial regulation, regulatory bank regulation is mainly based on the price, the business scope of funds direct control, market access, etc. Compliance regulation is primarily a later investigation, this method of market sensitivity is low, not fully reflect the bank's risk in time, the corresponding regulation measures also lags behind the market development. 2 it is capital of the regulatory period. In the mid - 1990 - s, began to stress the bank shall hold enough capital to withstand risks. But in the complex business environment, only simple quantitative ratio of capital is not enough. 3 it is the risk for this regulation stage. In Hong Kong, for example, the connotation of the risk for this as follows: the first to identify and measure the bank faces various risks when operating, and urged Banks to take effective management measures, to guard against and dissolve the risk. Its basic characteristics are: must be built on for the bank's risk recognition and measurement; Will be divided into the number of potential risks and risk control quality of two parts, respectively for analysis and evaluation; Risk assessment must be through the standardized way, risk classification and evaluation method should be consistent with international practice and the latest requirements; According to the result of risk assessment, regulatory resources concentrated in the banking institutions as much as possible the biggest risk facing link; The risk for this regulation is a continuous cycle of regulation. Risk for this model of regulation, the infiltration and filled with more data collection and analysis and prediction, mark the banking supervision to the higher level.
CBRC in time to keep up with the change and sublimation of international banking regulation practice, in its inception on banking financial institutions supervision information system construction project - "1104 project". Gradually established the risk as the basic framework of this regulation, implements the separation of the on-site inspection and off-site supervision, to join each other to establish off-site supervision and spot checks, effective cooperation mechanism, cooperating with each other gradually transition to a risk for this approach. The implementation of the "1104 project", is a major measure for implement risk for this regulatory system, is a revolution in the way of banking regulation in our country.
Since the 1980 s, when Banks and financial crisis of southeast Asia, made the bank's corporate governance problem is more and more attention. In 1999, the Basel committee on banking supervision issued "to strengthen the bank's corporate governance", make the corporate governance of commercial Banks has become a global topic, also help regulators to assess the quality of bank corporate governance. In recent years, the study of the importance and particularity of banking corporate governance is becoming more and more deeply. In China, corporate governance has evolved from a first academic concept to the core content of the current bank reform practice. In 2005, the China banking regulatory commission chairman liu mingkang multiple for a good bank comprehensively elaborated the core content of corporate governance. "From the perspective of regulation, corporate governance is the board of directors and senior management to lead and manage the bank operation and set science, architecture and system. General corporate governance include: bank within each organization clear responsibility boundary, independent and effective system of internal control, risk adjusted return on the assessment mechanism, on the basis of scientific incentive and constraint mechanism and advanced management information system and so on five aspects, it is also a good five features of banking corporate governance...
Since 2002, the people's bank of China began to formulate legal person bank corporate governance, the relevant provisions of the issued in succession joint-stock commercial Banks corporate governance guidelines, the shareholding commercial bank system of independent directors and external supervisors guidelines ". The guidance and supervision of the China banking regulatory commission in charge of the corporate governance reform work, successively issued "on the bank of China, China construction bank corporate governance reform and regulatory guidelines" and "joint-stock commercial bank's board of directors due diligence guidance" (trial), etc., is committed to guide commercial Banks to the advanced international Banks as the benchmark, the governance structure, management system and internal process reengineering.
Incentive compatibility regulation is incentive theory in the application of the regulation economics. In the regulation of banking, regulatory authorities eager to obtain reliable information, make a regulation conclusion more scientific, reasonable, and has the warning role. And banking institutions as the main body of the behavior of the other party, often for selfish reasons or other reasons, always one thousand ways to provide false information, or withhold any adverse information, which makes the conclusions of regulatory deviation or failure. Regulators want to get real information bank, or ensure that Banks make better measures for regulatory goal, must design and build an effective incentive mechanism. It is because of realising this, "incentive compatibility" this concept was used to summarize the development direction of banking supervision.
So-called incentive compatibility regulation, emphasizes the banking regulation can not only from the target of regulation set up the regulations, the business of banking institutions shall be referred to the target, the bank's internal management and market discipline into the category of regulation, guide the two forces to support to achieve the goal of regulation.
Incentive compatibility regulation has not very perfect, widely promotion mechanism. International banking practice and theoretical research on the incentive compatibility regulation began in 1995 ~ 1996 years before and after, with market risk amendment to the Basel capital accord and launch "prior commitment system" (PCA) theory as the logo.
After the concept of incentive compatibility regulation, after the establishment of the China banking regulatory commission received due attention and application, in the regulation is mainly on the fusion of internal management goals. Such as, implements classified regulation for Banks, according to the bank of different degree of risk, different regulation. Also, such as, in the capital management, highlights the principle of mutual coordination of incentive and constraint. While strengthen the commercial Banks capital constraints, improve capital adequacy ratio of commercial Banks providing incentives. Encourage capital adequacy ratio is high priority to the development of Banks, expand the scale of the credit. For undercapitalized Banks implement corrective and sanctions. The above measures, fully motivate and promote the development of Banks towards the goals and regulators that, to achieve the goal of regulation maximize returns.
Public regulation theory holds that banking is external effect and information asymmetry are the public sector is very outstanding, so need government regulation. Represented by the regulatory authorities of external supervision is a kind of public interests are not violated mandatory institutional arrangements. But the central role of the regulation is also have limits and boundaries, such as insufficient regulations lag, regulatory flexibility, so that the effective regulation is restricted. At the same time, the social intermediary, self-discipline, internal control, market constraints, also has certain regulatory advantage, become an important defense prevent bank risks. Thus between banking supervision and the above subject formed an integrated, organic link mechanism.
Conclusion结论
Regulators as the core of the regulatory link can be divided into two aspects: one is the indirect link, the regulatory authorities to strengthen the evaluation of commercial Banks internal control mechanism, the supervision of social intermediary and the guidance of the board of trade, to strengthen the supervision of bank information disclosure. This is a regulatory authorities for regulatory links the main way.
The other is the direct link. Main path: can entrust a bank to regulate the internal audit department; Entrust a social intermediary institution participation; The entrusted bank association auxiliary regulation. Regulators as the core of the regulatory link formed another form of supervision strengthened. To improve the depth and breadth of banking regulation, regulatory authorities should no longer be just embodied in unilateral efforts directly.
In the past three years, the China banking regulatory commission issued the trial measures on settling commercial Banks internal control evaluation, strengthen the internal control check. Issued guidance on the banking association, strengthen the guidance of industry self-discipline organization. A three-way meeting in due course. Promoting the construction of banking transparency, increase the intensity of the annual report disclosure. Practice has proved that regulators as the core of the regulatory link, has the important practical significance. In the long run, the banking industry, sound operation mechanism, not only lies in the regulation of regulatory authorities, more is through the regulatory link, prompting social intermediary, industry associations, Banks internal audit and the supervision and management of the regulatory authorities formed a kind of tacit understanding, become a kind of cooperation.
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Richards. The usual denomination was 50 or 100 pounds, so these notes were not an everyday currency for the common people
