管理学作业-企业风险管理实践

管理学essay-企业风险管理实践

　　本次调查的数据，我们会提供给一个研究联盟，这个联盟由普华永道会计师事务所、荷兰皇家特许会计师协会，荷兰格罗宁根大学，奈耶诺德商业大学的代表参加。这个联盟的研究目的是分析荷兰企业风险管理的实施和存在的问题。本次问卷因为没有被特别设计，所以有了某些方面的限制。因此我们会做一些实施的评估工作。但是，这些数据仍然是有价值的，因为它们至少可以为我们的企业风险管理提供一些设计和实施效果方面的信息。

　　The survey data we rely on in this paper have been made available to us by a research consortium involving representatives from PricewaterhouseCoopers, Royal NIVRA (the Dutch Institute of Chartered Public Accountants), the University of Groningen, and Nyenrode Business University2. The aim of this consortium was to map current ERM practices and issues in the Netherlands. The questionnaire has not been designed with the specific purposes of the current study in mind, which poses some limitations to what we can do qua variable construction and measurement. However, the data are still valuable, as they provide at least an informative insight into ERM adoption, design choices, and effectiveness.

　　有些已经获得广泛接受的观点认为，企业风险管理是有效管理企业的一个重要组成部分。无论如何，企业一定在某种程度上产生了变化。一些公司已经开始实施先进的企业风险管理系统，而其他公司则变得比较保守。在这篇文章中，我们将探讨一些因素，这有助于解释跨行业的企业风险管理实施的发展水平。在先前研究的基础上，我们确定了五个因素，我们希望这能对企业风险管理实施有价值。

　　The idea that ERM is a key component of effective governance has gained widespread acceptance. Nevertheless, organizations vary in the extent to which they have adopted it. Some organizations have invested in sophisticated ERM systems, whereas others rely on rather ad hoc responses to risks as they become manifest. In this section of the paper, we explore a number of factors that may help to explain the level of development of ERM practices across organizations. Building on previous studies, we identify five broad groups of factors that we expect to be associated with the extent of ERM implementation: regulatory influences; internal influences; ownership; auditor influence; and firm and industry-related characteristics.

　　The consortium identified organizations located in the Netherlands with annual revenues of more than EUR 10 million and more than 30 employees, using information from company.info. 9,579 organization appeared to fit these cumulative criteria. The survey was mailed to the Board of these organizations in May, 2009. 240 questionnaires were undeliverable. Of the remaining 9,339 surveys, 928 were returned, resulting in an overall response rate of 9.9%. Upon closer examination, however, 103 responses were found not to match the initial selection criteria after all, leaving a final sample of 825 observations. Respondents are board members, CFOs, or staff members in high organizational positions. We have no data to examine representativeness. The sample, however, is relatively large, and varied in terms of organizational size and industry. Table 1 gives a general description of the dataset. 

　　In many countries, regulators are pressing firms to improve risk management and risk reporting (Collier, Berry & Burke, 2006; Kleffner et al., 2003). Examples of regulatory pressure include the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules and the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US, and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the UK. Adoption of the principles of these codes is typically mandatory for publicly traded firms. In the Netherlands, firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are required to submit to the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, also known as the Tabaksblat Code. This code holds general provisions as to the maintenance of a sound risk management system. It has often been argued that ERM initiatives within organizations arise in response to regulatory pressure (e.g. Collier et al., 2006). Because this pressure is largest for publicly listed firms, we expect such firms to be more likely to adopt ERM (cf. also Kleffner et al., 2003):

　　Publicly traded companies, however, are not the only organizations that have been subjected to governance regulation. Governance rules are also fairly common in parts of the public and not-for-profit sector. In addition, some trade organizations have adopted governance codes as a membership requirement. We expect such organizations to have more elaborate ERM systems than organizations that need not conform to explicit governance expectations:

　　The decision to implement ERM is rather consequential, affecting the entire organization and implying major organizational change. Such far-reaching decisions require strong support from senior management. To emphasize their commitment to ERM, many organizations choose to locate ultimate responsibility for risk management explicitly at the senior executive level by appointing a Chief Risk Officer (CRO). Presumably, senior executive leadership is a powerful catalyst for organizational change, and may significantly speed up the process of ERM implementation (Beasley et al., 2005; Beasley et al., 2008):#p#分页标题#e#

　　Another internal factor to influence ERM development is the presence of an audit committee. Audit committees play an important role in the oversight of risk management practices. In this monitoring role, they can exert influence on the board to ensure that ERM gets sufficient management attention, and that sufficient resources are being invested to further ERM development:

　　Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) argue that pressure from shareholders is an important driving force behind ERM adoption (cf. also Mikes, 2009). As institutional block holders are typically more powerful than individual shareholders (Kane & Velury, 2004), Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) suggest that a higher degree of institutional ownership is positively associated with the extent of ERM adoption:

　　Arguably, insider owners have even more influence over management than institutional owners, especially if these insiders hold a controlling share in the firm. This is the case in owner-managed firms. However, owner-managers have less incentive to press for ERM. Because agency problems between owners and management are absent in owner-managed firms, the value of ERM is lower in such firms, ceteris paribus. Also, owner-managers tend to rely less on formal control systems (Lovata & Costigan, 2002), which makes them unlikely sponsors of ERM. Therefore: 

　　For some firms, the value of ERM is larger than for others. Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) hypothesize that ERM is especially important for firms that experience significant growth (cf. also Beasley et al., 2008; Gordon et al., 2009). Such firms face more uncertainties and require better risk management to control the risks that arise in the process, but also to include the risk profile of various growth opportunities in organizational decision making.

　　The size of the organization is also likely to affect the extent of ERM adoption (Beasley et al., 2003; Kleffner et al., 2003). Presumably, there are considerable economies of scale involved in operating an ERM system, and it may well be the case that only larger organizations can afford a fully functional ERM system:

　　Several studies have proposed the existence of industry effects. Quite commonly, it is assumed that firms in the financial services industry are more likely to embrace ERM (Beasley et al., 2005; Kleffner et al., 2003; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). Since the release of Basel II, banks experience strong incentives to adopt ERM, as that may help to reduce capital requirements (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Wahlström, 2009; cf. also Mikes, 2009). In addition, ERM may serve as a valuable commitment device in the banking industry, lowering the cost of capital (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). 

　　Another sector that seems more prone to ERM adoption is the energy industry. Kleffner et al. (2003) report that energy firms are relatively heavy ERM users, which they ascribe to the volatile markets in which these firms operate. Because ERM may reduce earnings volatility (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2003), firms in such markets may value ERM more than firms that face stable market conditions. Accordingly: