留学生essay代写范例：Learning curve and experience curve
留学生essay代写范例-学习曲线和经验曲线。本文是一篇由本站代写服务提供的essay代写参考，主要内容是讲述本文将试图区分学习曲线和经验曲线，并提出这些不同的曲线如何产生竞争优势。必须观察为什么许多人会得出这两条曲线是相同的结论。James P.Gilbert（Experience and Learning Curves，2010）提供了经验和学习曲线的基本概念，指出：“经验和学习曲线模型是在个人和组织通过工作获得知识的基本前提下发展起来的。通过重复获得经验，组织和个人在行为或学习方面会产生相对永久的变化。随着服务中发生额外的交易，或是制造商生产更多的产品，单位成本往往会以递减的速度下降。这种现象遵循指数曲线。”下面就一起来看一下这篇留学生essay代写范例。
This essay will attempt to distinguish between the learning and experience curves and propose how each of these distinct curves may give rise to competitive advantages.
It is imperative to observe why many individuals may come to the conclusion that these two curves are one and the same. James P. Gilbert (Experience and Learning Curves, 2010) provides the basic notion of experience and learning curves, stating that:
“Experience and learning curve models are developed from the basic premise that individuals and organisations acquire knowledge by doing work. By gaining experience through repetition, organisations and individuals develop relatively permanent changes in behaviour or learning. As additional transactions occur in a service, or more products are produced by a manufacturer, the per-unit cost often decreases at a decreasing rate. This phenomenon follows an exponential curve.”
本文将试图区分学习曲线和经验曲线，并提出这些不同的曲线如何产生竞争优势。
必须观察为什么许多人会得出这两条曲线是相同的结论。James P.Gilbert（Experience and Learning Curves，2010）提供了经验和学习曲线的基本概念，指出：
“经验和学习曲线模型是在个人和组织通过工作获得知识的基本前提下发展起来的。通过重复获得经验，组织和个人在行为或学习方面会产生相对永久的变化。随着服务中发生额外的交易，或是制造商生产更多的产品，单位成本往往会以递减的速度下降。这种现象遵循指数曲线。”
The frequent interchangeable use of the terms learning curve and experience curve can be easily disproved upon examination of their respective definitions, which differ. John L. Colley (1991, p.1) postulates that “the learning curve expresses graphically the observable exponential increase in the cumulative volume of production as costs are reduced due to a reduction in labour input hours as workers learn their jobs (i.e. cumulative learning experience)”. Contrastingly, the experience curve applies to process orientated as well as labour intensive production methods, as according to Hall and Howell (1985, p.197-212) “the experience curve is an analytical tool designed to quantify the rate at which experience of accumulated output, to date, affects total lifetime costs”. Gilbert (Experience and Learning Curves, 2010) best summarises the differences between learning and experience curves: “the experience curve is broader than the learning curve with respect to the costs covered, the range of output during which the reductions in costs take place, and the causes of reduction”.
The cost leadership aspect of Porter’s (1980) two dimensional strategic choice leading to competitive advantage model is substantiated by the learning curve. Sami Daniel (Strategic Assets, 2003, p.7) elaborates specifically on the cost leadership aspect of Porter’s (1980) model, stating that “Cost leadership: producing the same product at lower cost creating barriers to entry through economies of scale and experience”. When a firm has the cost advantage associable to the reduction in its costs of production as a result of a reduction in the number of hours of labour it employs (due to workers increasing their familiarity of production methods), it moves along the learning curve and experiences increased cumulative frequency of output. As a result, such a firm has the competitive advantages of economies of scale and barriers to entry into the industry.
John L. Colley (1991, p.2) exemplifies this further with Grumman Aerospace Corporation during 1970, stating that:
“Grumman Aerospace Corporation was successful at realising the learning curve effect. Grumman began with a massive cost-cutting campaign in 1970 when severe overrun problems developed with their newest aircraft, the F-14 Tomcat. Grumman had everyone in the manufacturing organisation question costs and developed a special ‘productivity’ group with people who had nothing to do but challenge costs. As a result, Grumman was able to achieve a reduction in the cost per plane and number of manufacturing hours per plane, making the F-14 Tomcat the staple fighter aircraft in the US Air force during the 1970’s, thus giving rise to barriers to entry and economies of scale (due to cost advantage)”.
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) observed a distinct and consistent relationship between the costs of production and the cumulative volume of output during the 1960’s, production costs declined as the cumulative volume of output increased. Sami Daniel (Strategic Assets, 2003, p.5-6) elaborates upon this example in relation to competitive advantages:
“The Boston Consulting Group saw two processes at work that led to a cost based competitive advantage, process innovation: repetitive task mastery and continuous minor improvements in production methods by management, and product refinement: standardisation of components, redesign of product to incorporate less expensive materials, or better focus on consumer needs. Economies of scale were also experienced: capital costs do not increase at the same rate as capacity, hence unit costs fall. These effects led to barriers to entry and the aggressive acquisition of market share.”
In conclusion, the experience and learning curves are divisible based upon their respective definitions. Firms who are on such curves can acquire competitive advantages such as cost advantages, economies of scale and barriers to entry.
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5. Does the Boston Consulting Group’s product life-cycle view of company diversification satisfactorily answer scepticism about the portfolio explanations of this phenomenon? Explain your answer.
This essay will systematically individually ascertain what the portfolio explanation and the Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG) product life cycle view of company diversification is and in doing so, will examine whether the latter view satisfactorily answers scepticism about the former postulation (i.e. when accounting for synergy).
The risk reduction approach to company diversification is as Sami Daniel (Diversification, 2003, p.6) infers, “an extension of a theory developed in the field of finance: the portfolio theory of investment. It deals with the risks of holding different financial assets or stocks.” The portfolio theory of investment was postulated by the economist Harry Markowitz (1952) in his paper “The Utility of Wealth”, which changed the way people perceive diversification. The general axioms of Markowitz’s (1952) paper are best summarised by Pickford (2001, p.92-93), who states:
“Markowitz said that shareholders could reduce the variance of their investment returns by holding a diversified portfolio. Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory shows that diversification by investors potentially eliminates the risk associated with the unique attributes that are specific to any given company.”
The linkage between the portfolio theory and corporate diversification is elaborated upon by Daniel (Diversification, 2003, p.6) who declares that:
“This model (portfolio theory) has been used to explain conglomerate diversification – in this instance, firms are merely insuring against unique risks by diversifying into unrelated activities”.
The portfolio (hedging) theory has a degree of scepticism associated to it when it accounts for synergy (payoff). Daniel (Diversification, 2003, p.6) states that “if the market costs of exploiting synergy between a number of firms are high, added value will be created by linking activities in a single organisation, which is consistent with shareholder wealth maximisation. Neil Kay (1982) believes that synergy and correspondence will lead to interrelatedness. Kay coins the term ‘catastrophe’, defined as “the phenomenon external to the firm (i.e. government policies, technological progress and consumer habits) which directly precipitates the decline and obsolescence phase of the product life cycle” (1982, p.72). Bouvier (1984) analyses the coinage ‘catastrophe’ further:
“For firms that operate within turbulent technological environments, subject to rapid acceleration of the rate of technological change, catastrophe always beckons. In this situation, synergy, once a blessing, now becomes a curse. The vaunted interconnections now can help bring down the firm, for if one product fails, others may follow, given synergistic bonds.”
Firms in such a scenario have a trade off dilemma between hedging and synergy. BCG’s life cycle view of corporate diversification can help such firms make this difficult decision.
A firm’s preferred scenario is illustrated in Daniel’s (Diversification, 2003, p.6) proposition that “the prime concern at corporate level is the achievement of a balanced portfolio of businesses that assures an adequate cash flow with which to finance the growth of the firm”. BCG’s non-traditional approach to diversification is a fusion of its experience curve analysis (market share, economies of learning and cost based advantages) and the product life cycle (market growth rate), whereby a matrix approach is undertaken (the Boston Box). The BCG matrix offers an answer to the puzzle of the portfolio view of diversification. Ricky Griffin (2008, p.218-219) evaluates the BCG matrix approach to the life cycle model of corporate diversification as follows:
学习曲线和经验曲线这两个术语的频繁可互换使用，在检查它们各自不同的定义时，很容易被推翻。John L.Colley（1991年，第1页）假设，“学习曲线以图形方式表示了随着工人学习工作（即累积学习经验），劳动力投入时间减少，成本降低，累积产量的可观察指数增长”。相反，经验曲线适用于以过程为导向的以及劳动密集型的生产方法，根据Hall和Howell（1985，第197-212页）的说法，“经验曲线是一种分析工具，旨在量化迄今为止累积产出的经验对总寿命成本的影响率”。Gilbert（Experience and Learning Curves，2010）最好地总结了学习曲线和经验曲线之间的差异：“在所涵盖的成本、成本降低期间的产出范围以及降低的原因方面，经验曲线比学习曲线更宽”。
Porter（1980）的二维战略选择导致竞争优势模型的成本领先方面通过学习曲线得到了证实。Sami Daniel（《战略资产》，2003年，第7页）具体阐述了波特（1980）模型的成本领先方面，指出“成本领先：以较低的成本生产相同的产品，通过规模经济和经验创造进入壁垒”。当一家公司因其雇佣的劳动力小时数减少（由于工人对生产方法的熟悉程度提高）而具有与生产成本降低相关的成本优势时，它会沿着学习曲线前进，并经历累积产出频率的增加。因此，这样一家公司具有规模经济和进入该行业壁垒的竞争优势。
John L.Colley（1991年，第2页）在1970年与格鲁曼航空航天公司进一步证明了这一点，并指出：
“格鲁曼航空航天公司成功地实现了学习曲线效应。格鲁曼公司在1970年开始了一场大规模的成本削减活动，当时他们的最新飞机F-14雄猫出现了严重的超支问题。格鲁门公司让制造组织中的每个人都质疑成本，并成立了一个特殊的‘生产力’小组，成员除了挑战成本外别无选择。因此，格鲁曼能够降低每架飞机的成本和每架飞机制造的小时数，使F-14雄鹰成为20世纪70年代美国空军的主要战斗机，从而（由于成本优势）增加了进入壁垒和规模经济”。
波士顿咨询集团（BCG）观察到，生产成本与累计产量之间存在明显且一致的关系。在20世纪60年代，生产成本随着累计产量的增加而下降。Sami Daniel（《战略资产》，2003年，第5-6页）阐述了这个与竞争优势相关的例子：
“波士顿咨询集团看到了两个过程，这两个过程产生了基于成本的竞争优势，即过程创新：重复的任务掌握和管理层对生产方法的持续微小改进，以及产品改进：部件标准化，重新设计产品以采用更便宜的材料，或更好地关注消费者需求。还经历了规模经济：资本成本的增长速度与产能的增长速度不同，因此单位成本下降。这些影响导致了进入壁垒和市场份额的积极获取。”
总之，经验曲线和学习曲线可以根据它们各自的定义进行分割。处于这种曲线上的公司可以获得竞争优势，如成本优势、规模经济和进入壁垒。
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5.波士顿咨询集团关于公司多元化的产品生命周期观点是否令人满意地回答了对这一现象的投资组合解释的怀疑？解释你的答案。
本文将系统地单独确定投资组合解释和波士顿咨询集团（BCG）对公司多元化的产品生命周期观是什么，并在这样做的过程中，检验后一种观点是否令人满意地回答了对前一假设的怀疑（即，当考虑协同效应时）。
公司多元化的风险降低方法正如Sami Daniel（diversification，2003，p.6）所推断的那样，是“金融领域发展起来的一种理论的延伸：投资组合理论。它处理持有不同金融资产或股票的风险。”投资组合理论是经济学家Harry Markowitz（1952）在其论文《财富的效用》中提出的，它改变了人们对多元化的看法。皮克福德（Pickford，2001，p.92-93）对Markowitz（1952）论文的一般公理进行了最好的总结，他指出：
“Markowitz说，股东可以通过持有多元化的投资组合来减少投资回报的差异。Markowitz的投资组合理论表明，投资者的多元化可能会消除与任何特定公司特有的独特属性相关的风险。”
Daniel（diversification，2003，第6页）阐述了投资组合理论与公司多元化之间的联系，他宣称：
“这一模型（投资组合理论）已被用于解释企业集团多元化——在这种情况下，企业只是通过将业务多样化到不相关的活动来防范独特的风险”。
投资组合（对冲）理论在考虑协同效应（回报）时有一定程度的怀疑。Daniel（Diversification，2003，第6页）指出，“如果利用多个公司之间协同作用的市场成本很高，那么将通过将单个组织中的活动联系起来来创造附加值，这与股东财富最大化是一致的。Neil Kay（1982）认为协同作用和对应关系将导致相互关联。Kay创造了“灾难”一词，定义为“公司外部的现象（即政府政策、技术进步和消费者习惯），直接导致产品生命周期的衰退和过时阶段”（1982，第72页）。Bouvier（1984）进一步分析了铸币的“灾难”：
“对于那些在动荡的技术环境中运营的公司来说，随着技术变革速度的快速加快，灾难总是在召唤着他们。在这种情况下，协同作用曾经是一种祝福，现在却变成了一种诅咒。现在引以为豪的相互连接有助于摧毁公司，因为如果一种产品失败，其他产品可能会紧随其后，形成协同纽带。”
在这种情况下，企业在对冲和协同之间存在权衡困境。波士顿咨询公司对企业多元化的生命周期观可以帮助这些企业做出这一艰难的决定。
Daniel（Diversification，2003，p.6）的主张说明了公司的首选方案，即“公司层面的首要关注点是实现平衡的业务组合，确保有足够的现金流为公司的增长提供资金”。波士顿咨询集团的非传统多元化方法融合了其经验曲线分析（市场份额、学习经济和基于成本的优势）和产品生命周期（市场增长率），从而采用矩阵方法（波士顿盒子）。BCG矩阵为多元化投资组合观的困惑提供了答案。Ricky Griffin（2008，第218-219页）对企业多元化生命周期模型的BCG矩阵方法进行了如下评估：
“The BCG matrix suggests that fast growing markets in which a company has the highest market share are more attractive business opportunities than slow growing markets in which a firm has small market share. The matrix classifies the types of businesses in which a diversified firm can engage as dogs (businesses that do not hold much economic promise), cash cows (businesses that have large share of market that isn’t expected to grow substantially), question marks (businesses that have a small share in a quickly growing market) and stars (businesses that have the largest share of a rapidly growing market). The BCG matrix suggests that “dogs” shouldn’t be invested in, and that a firm should sell them as soon as possible as they have little economic promise. “Cash cows” generate high profits and a firm should use this to support “question marks” and “stars”. If the performance of “question marks” doesn’t live up to expectations, they should be reclassified as “dogs” and divested (i.e. BMW’s purchase and subsequent sale of Rover). Thus cash generated by “cash cows” should be invested in “stars” to ensure their preeminent position.”
In conclusion, BCG’s product life-cycle view of company diversification can satisfactorily answer scepticism about the portfolio explanations (i.e. when accounting for synergy) of corporate diversification by providing a solution to the portfolio view puzzle.
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7 How far can the success of Japanese firms be accounted for by superior ability to create an effective ‘organisational knowledge spiral’ (Nonaka and Takeushi, 1995)?
This essay will determine the extent to which the success enjoyed by Japanese firms can be accounted for by their superior ability to create an effective ‘organisational knowledge spiral’.
The success of Japanese firms is characterised by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.3), who state:
“The success of Japanese companies is not due to their manufacturing prowess; access to cheap capital; close and cooperative relationships with costumers, suppliers, and other agencies, or lifetime employment, seniority system, and other human resources management practices-although all of these factors, of course are important. Instead, we make the claim that Japanese companies have been successful because of their skills and expertise at ‘organisational knowledge creation’. By organisational knowledge creation we mean the capability of a company as a whole to create new knowledge, disseminate it throughout the organisation, and embody it in products, services, and systems.”
The ability of Japanese firms to create an ‘organisational knowledge spiral’, involves the two dimensions of organisational knowledge creation as derived by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) – epistemological (tacit and explicit) and ontological (individual-team-firm) knowledge.
Daniel (Innovation and Competition, 2003, p.7) summarises from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) that “Japanese firms view knowledge as being tacit i.e. inherently difficult to communicate and share, largely because it is context-specific and based upon intuition, personal experience and beliefs.”
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.4, 59, 62-63) argue the existence of four modes of knowledge creation or conversion that gives rise to the innovative and successful outcomes of Japanese firms’ activity and operation:
“The first mode of knowledge conversion is from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge, or the process of socialisation, whereby individuals within a firm acquire tacit knowledge from others within the firm by way of face-to-face exchanges such as mentoring, Honda’s brainstorming sessions and apprenticeships. The second mode of knowledge conversion is from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge, or the process of externalisation, which involves metaphors and analogies, such that previous tacit knowledge can be written down (i.e. becomes tangible), like when Canon used the disposal drum in its new mini-coppier. The third mode of knowledge conversion is from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge, or the process of combination, whereby individuals in a company would combine discrete explicit pieces of knowledge into new forms such as a report, like Kraft’s micro-merchandising of consumer instore behaviour. The fourth and final mode of knowledge conversion is from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge, or the process of internalisation, whereby individual’s ‘internalise’ what they have experienced, ready to pass on this knowledge to someone else.”
Combining these four modes of knowledge conversion or creation, whereby one knowledge type is converted into another, leads to “the organisational knowledge spiral, which emerges when the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge is elevated dynamically from a lower
ontological level to higher levels” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 57) .
In his review of ‘Nonaka and Takeuchi’s theory of organisational knowledge creation’
D. McLean (2004) summates the final procedural aspects of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) theory of knowledge creation and the Japanese firm:
“Their theory also explains how individual knowledge is “amplified” into and throughout the organisation through these four modes of knowledge conversion and under five conditions that enable and promote organisational knowledge spiral creation. These conditions include Intention (organisational aspiration), Autonomy (to examine unexploited scenarios), Fluctuation and Creative Chaos (managers deliberately upsetting the routine of the office to break down barriers to learning and efficiency), Redundancy (promoting socialisation), and Requisite Variety (information available to workers to help them deal with any impromptu situations). Finally, the theory consists of a five-phase organisational knowledge creation process. These five phases are: 1) sharing tacit knowledge, 2) creating concepts, 3) justifying concepts, 4) building an archetype, and 5) cross-levelling knowledge.”
The successes enjoyed by Japanese firms such as Toyota, Honda and Sony are quite substantially explainable via by the postulations of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) about the superior ability of Japanese firms to create an effective organisational knowledge spiral and in doing so, being able to quickly disseminate this newly created or converted forms of knowledge through organisation, into new systems, products, technologies and methodologies. There will however, always exist a small degree of the success associable to Japanese firms that isn’t attributable to a superior ability to effectively create an organisational knowledge spiral; this is success or failure due to market risk and forces. It should be noted that the examples of knowledge creation given above prove that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s theory isn’t culturally specific; it is universal in its application.
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“BCG矩阵表明，公司市场份额最高的快速增长市场比公司市场份额较小的缓慢增长市场更有吸引力。该矩阵将多元化公司可以参与的业务类型划分为狗（没有太多经济前景的业务）、摇钱树（市场份额较大但预计不会大幅增长的业务），问号（在快速增长的市场中份额较小的业务）和明星（在快速发展的市场中占有最大份额的业务）。BCG矩阵认为，不应投资“狗”，公司应在几乎没有经济前景的情况下尽快出售它们。“摇钱树”能产生高利润，公司应该用它来支持“问号”和“明星”。如果“问号”的表现没有达到预期，它们应该被重新归类为“狗”并被剥离（即宝马收购和随后出售罗孚）。因此，“摇钱树”产生的现金应该投资于“明星”，以确保他们的卓越地位。”
总之，波士顿咨询集团关于公司多元化的产品生命周期观可以通过提供投资组合观难题的解决方案，令人满意地回答人们对公司多元化的投资组合解释（即当考虑协同效应时）的怀疑。
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7日本企业的成功在多大程度上可以通过创造有效的“组织知识螺旋”的卓越能力来解释（Nonaka和Takeushi，1995）？
本文将确定日本公司所享有的成功在多大程度上可以通过其创造有效的“组织知识螺旋”的卓越能力来解释。
Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995年，第3页）是日本企业成功的特点，他们指出：
“日本公司的成功并不是因为它们的制造能力；获得廉价资本的机会；与客户、供应商和其他机构的密切合作关系，或者终身雇佣、资历制度和其他人力资源管理实践，尽管所有这些因素当然都很重要。相反，我们声称日本公司之所以成功，是因为它们在‘组织知识创造’方面的技能和专业知识。我们所说的组织知识创造是指公司作为一个整体创造新知识、在整个组织中传播新知识并将其体现在产品、服务和系统中的能力。”
日本企业创造“组织知识螺旋”的能力涉及Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）提出的组织知识创造的两个维度——认识论（隐性和显性）和本体论（个体团队企业）知识。
Daniel（Innovation and Competition，2003，第7页）从Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）总结道：“日本公司认为知识是隐性的，即天生难以沟通和分享，主要是因为它是特定于环境的，基于直觉、个人经验和信念。”
Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995年，第4页，第59页，第62-63页）认为，存在四种知识创造或转化模式，这些模式导致了日本企业活动和运营的创新和成功成果：
“知识转换的第一种模式是从隐性知识到隐性知识，或社会化过程，即企业内的个人通过面对面的交流，如辅导、本田的头脑风暴会议和学徒制，从企业内的其他人那里获得隐性知识。知识转换的第二种模式是由隐性知识到显性知识，或外部化过程，包括隐喻和类比，这样以前的隐性知识就可以写下来（即变得有形），就像佳能在其新的迷你直升机上使用处理滚筒时一样。第三种知识转换模式是从显性知识到显性知识，或组合过程，即公司中的个人将离散的显性知识片段组合成新的形式，如报告，如卡夫对消费者店内行为的微观营销。知识转换的第四种也是最后一种模式是从显性知识到隐性知识，或内化的过程，即个人将他们所经历的‘内化’，准备将这些知识传递给他人。”
将这四种知识转换或创造模式相结合，即一种知识类型转换为另一种知识，会导致“组织知识螺旋”，当隐性知识和显性知识之间的互动从较低的水平动态提升时，就会出现这种螺旋
本体论层次到更高层次”（野中和竹内，1995年，第57页）。
在他对“野中和竹内的组织知识创造理论”的评论中
D.McLean（2004）总结了Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）的知识创造理论和日本公司的最后程序方面：
他们的理论还解释了个人知识是如何通过这四种知识转换模式以及在五种条件下“放大”到组织内部和整个组织的，这五种条件能够促进组织知识的螺旋式创造。这些条件包括意图（组织愿望）、自主性（检查未开发的场景）、波动和创造性混乱（管理者故意打乱办公室的日常工作，以打破学习和效率的障碍）、冗余（促进社交）和必要的多样性（工作人员可获得的信息，帮助他们处理任何即兴情况）。最后，该理论由五个阶段的组织知识创造过程组成。这五个阶段是：1）分享隐性知识，2）创造概念，3）证明概念的合理性，4）建立原型，以及5）交叉知识。”
Nonaka和Takeuchi（1995）假设日本公司有卓越的能力创造有效的组织知识螺旋，并在这样做的过程中，能够通过组织将这种新创造或转换的知识形式迅速传播到新的系统、产品、技术和方法中，这在很大程度上可以解释丰田、本田和索尼等日本公司所取得的成功。然而，总有一小部分成功和日本公司有关，并不能归因于有效创造组织知识螺旋的卓越能力；这是市场风险和力量造成的成败。值得注意的是，以上知识创造的例子证明了野中和竹内的知识创造理论不具有文化特异性；它在应用上具有普遍性。
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