保险人与诉讼风险:文献综述范文
时间:2016-01-25 10:58:05 来源:www.ukthesis.org 作者:英国论文网 点击:163次
保险人与诉讼风险是否影响Ipo定价 用公共基金的策略来使公司获得额外的资金。在此之前,公司必须公布马来西亚之前邀请公众购买其股票的分享。但对于非上市公司他们不能简单地发布分享公共,而必须首先在马来西亚上市。当他们第一次想问题分享公共,他们还必须发布招股说明书,这是他们首次公开发行(ipo)(第一次公开的)。 马来西亚股市IPO开始于马来西亚1960年建立马来西亚证交所。1973 年吉隆坡证券交易所有限公司(KLSEB)和新加坡证交所(SES)开始取代马来西亚证交所。在此期间发行上市的公司数量不足500家公司。从1973年到2007年上市的趋势显示快速发布。1973年上市公司的数量只有262年,直到2007年,马来西亚股市有1028个公司。这种新上市公司数量迅速增加归因于多种因素,主要为扩张融资,降低新基金的成本并降低杠杆水平(Shamsher et al .,1994)。1980年,市场估值在马来西亚是RM43十亿,在2007年达到一万亿林吉特。它总是发生在许多公司都开始上市基金的时候。 除了在1991年到2003年,各个零售商构成了超过85%的市场份额在马来西亚上市。与个体零售商组相比,机构投资者集团是报告一个较小的平均为2.05%。剩下的6.47%是由市场参与者组成的。从1984年到1995年上市的新问题在主板KLSE是173公司。类似这样的,某些公司想要发行IPO时,受法律要求分配30%的马来人的投资者。马来人的主要目标是确保自己的股权,至少占整个市场份额的33%。
Going to public fund is one of the strategies to company to getting additional fund. Before that, company must publish their share to bursa Malaysia before invite the public to buying their share. But for unlisted company they cannot simply publish their share to public and they must be listed in bursa Malaysia first. With that they must publish their prospectus when the first time they want to issue share to public and this is we called Initial Public Offering (first time going to public). Apart from that in year 1991 to 2003 the individual retailers have constituted more than 85% of the market player in bursa Malaysia IPO. Compared to the individual retailers group, the institutional investors group is reporting a smaller average at 2.05%. The remaining 6.47% of the market participants is consisting of others. From the 1984 to the 1995 the newly issue of IPO on the main board on KLSE is 173 company. Similar like that, when certain company wants to issuing the IPO, they are requiring by law to allocate 30% for Bumiputra investor. The main objective is to ensure the Bumiputra has own shareholding at least 33% on the entire market share. The pricing of IPO in Malaysia are regulated by Security Commission (SC) and it only take place when ministry of Trade and Finance (MITI) and Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) have giving their consent to the listing. It means the SC has make valuation on company in term of company financial statement and performance to evaluate whether certain company is really valuable to publish on the bursa Malaysia. One of the differential and unique IPO in Malaysia is, major of shareholder and the promoting bank (underwriter) have the choice to provide the profit guarantee not less than 90% on forecast profit on prospectus. Another way, the prospectus of company must be publish in Bahasa or English language and it must submitted to MITI, FIC and SC and the first trading is about in 12 month. The company, is not to seek approval the right issue from the SC during the 12 month they are listing, because actually the time between companies submit prospectus date to the SC for approval right issue to start trading is about 6 month. Recent reforms in Government Linked Companies (GLCs) are expected to improve performance and encourage private investment. More than 40 GLC’s are listed, comprising less than 10% of Malaysia’s GDP. Changes in management, adoption of performance based contracts for management and implementation of key performance indicators (KPIs) are some of the reform that has been underway since April-May 2004.
Merger and Aquistion (M&A) actively declined in volume terms, due to a lack of very large transaction. Nonetheless, the number of M&A transactions has remained stable over the past two years. Singapore’s Temasek Holdings acquired large minatory positions in Malaysia banking and plantations companies. In the automotive industry, Chery Automotive, a Chinese assembler has announced plans to earmark Malaysia as their regional distribution hub, while Proton reached a deal to assemble Volkswagen Cars and distribute them in Southeast Asia. Proton, Sime Darby and Telecom Malaysia have all announced acquisitions of foreign companies too. Apart from underwriter, second areas on this research will looks on information of the companies, information also can become higher cost for issuer, they will incur cost to encourage information generation prior to the IPO and after the IPO because issuer want giving good impression to customer about their company. But for customer, cost will be incurred when they want searching strong information about certain company profile. Basically, IPO will be determining by investment bank and IPO firm managements to setting up IPO price (offer price spread). This to make comparison, between company offer price (company determine IPO price) and what actual price should be offer by company.
On top of that, potential litigation costs are quite significant for firms that have recently gone public. Attorney fees, the costs of management time allocated to the lawsuit, reputation costs, and settlement costs represent an enormous potential liability for a young firm. The last areas we will look on relation between risk and IPO in an aspect of the litigation-risk, where the firms with higher litigation risk will affect their IPO? After data are already collected it will be need to be edited, then data have to be coded and lastly data have to be key in and software programmed used to analyze the data. After data has been analyzed, we can make interpretation to getting conclusion about our research and make recommendation or suggestion to make improvement to Malaysia IPO. The final result also can be use for investor to do decision making about the attraction investment for them.
Apart from that the investor has purchase of share listed in the secondary market obtain nominal yield, with are lower on average than in the new issue market. This extra return in a new issue market is the insider value factor which make offer price lower thus giving a high return. The over subscription of new issue keep feeding the frenzy for new issue. One study has suggest that the over subscription rate in Malaysia average 46 time (Dawson 1987, Yong 1991). Similar like that the new issues are price by the market at a much higher level than would be the case if (a) the new issue was equally like to be issue in bull or bear market and (b) there is no frenzy in wanting to subscribe to new issue. Because of the frenzy in the new market issue, there is practice pressure during the initial few month, which keep the price artificially high during this early period after listing. At the same thing, one would expect the price in the new issue market to attain normal level after the initial few month when normal price unfettered by price pressure begin to emerge. For another part the new issue are substantially underprice in the Australian, UK, USA and the developed market. It similar behavior found in Malaysia because the offer price appears to be a deep discount of the initial day for market price. But the extent of underpricing is smaller in the developed market than in the developing market.
The research finding on the IPO in the some developed country such as Australia, UK, USA and developing market such as Korea, Malaysia Singapore and other suggest an apparent underpricing of new issue because offer price appear to be a large discount off the initial listing day market prices. Considered again the long run share market return report in all these country, and the reward rate of those allocation new issue are substantially higher than normal rate of return in the secondary market of these country. Therefore, new issue should provide higher reward, which is the source of underpricing. apart from that the investment bankers try to reduce the offer risk and cost of underwriting by underpricing the issue. The present evidence of underpricing may also be due to the uncertainty about the real value of share and the related need to offer compensation to the investor for assuming the risk of the uncertainty. But for recent research has been done (Arif, Prasad, Shamsher and Annuar 1994) contradict this widely disseminated explanation. Share appears to be issue at their intrinsic value but then price are bid up by an optimistic investment market, which wrongly interpret demand pressure as understanding. While Ross (1984) explain the underpricing of IPO using the idea of information asymmetry between informed and unimformed investor. He suggest that the asymmetry of information between the issuer and their investment banker is less relevant for pricing. They also examined the impact of retail sentiment on secondary markets return and found there were a strong positive relationship between the proportion of small trades and open to close returns consistent with the view that retail demand and sentiment can push IPO prices higher. But this argument assumes that these overoptimistic retail investors would ultimately experience a reversal.
They also argue that information asymmetry can be in the form of aggregate demand uncertainty, which is unlikely to be resolved until the IPO opens for secondary market trading.
Average cost of capital will be lowering when market is imperfection and it increase value of the firm subsequent to borrowing. But for (Robicheck and Myer 1966, Hamada 1972) the firm financial risk will be increase when company has make decision to continuously borrowing. For another part if company is have extra debt, the shareholder risk will be higher. It happens because if these companies are going to bankruptcy, the first company obligation action is paying all their debt first. For (Gupta 1982) before company achieves maximum debt, the maximum value of the firm will always be reach first. Company has made decision going to public because they want to increase fund to run the business in big scale. For (Gordon 1990) examined the relationship between a firm financing structure and the company technology. His result has supported the idea that firm with high capital to labor ratio acquire financing to run it business. Further, consistent with the deterrence effect of IPO, there is evidence that firms that engage in more IPO significantly lower their litigation risks, especially for lawsuits occurring closer to the IPO dates. After controlling for the endogeneity of initial returns and lawsuit probability, both the insurance and deterrence aspects of the litigation-risk. The simultaneous-equation framework used in this study is potentially useful for other settings.
Investment bankers are responsible for coordinating the stock offering for the IPO firm’s managers (Benviste and Spindt, 1989). They provide an invaluable source of guidance for IPO firm entrepreneurs and managers, most of whom will have had no prior experience with the complex, often lengthy, process of taking the firm public. In addition to facilitating the IPO process by counseling firms’ entrepreneurs and managers, investment bankers assume primary responsibility for effectively marketing the firm’s securities to the investment community. The investment bankers determine the offer price spread, which must be disclosed either in the preliminary prospectus or shortly after filing the registration statement in an amended prospectus. The actual offer price is not determined until the day prior to the stock’s offering.#p#分页标题#e#
This spread and offer price are of central importance to the entrepreneurs taking the firm public, as they determine the amount of funds the IPO firm’s owners can expect to raise as a function of the stock offering. Given their centrality in the IPO process, it is important to understand those factors that may assist investment bankers in their initial determination of the spread within which they believe the final offer price will be set and, subsequently, the final offer price. The price spread may provide an indication of the level of uncertainty surrounding the IPO. Uncertainty in the IPO context derives largely from the fact that the firm, while it may have an extensive operating history, has not previously operated under public scrutiny.
This chapter are consist and will be discuss about the purpose of the study, population of study, data collection, independent variable, dependent variable, research modeling and the lastly the data analysis.
Second independent variable is Litigation Risk, as argued earlier, a firm about to make an IPO faces a trade-off in its pricing decisions. A higher offer price increases proceeds from the IPO, but it also raises the expected litigation costs. Two predictions emerge concerning the cross-sectional relations between IPO and inherent litigation risks. First, firms with higher litigation risk purchase more insurance, that is, they their shares by a greater amount (the insurance effect). Second, firms who choose higher levels of insurance incur lower expected litigation costs in the form of reduced probabilities of lawsuits.#p#分页标题#e#
The third part is underwriting. The underwriter is playing to influence the public confidence about the company. If the company IPO is not over subscribe, the underwriter will be help that company to resell the IPO and maybe buying the IPO behalf of the company. When the company first time to setting the IPO price, it to hart to determine the suitable price because lack of expertise. The simple way to company is making negotiate with the underwriter. The issuer and underwriter is lock to the offer price regardless of the subscription of the market movement. Basically inside the underwriter agreement it conclude the underwritten fee, amount and whether the issue will indemnify the underwriter again all liability, cost and expence incur by the underwriter in relationship to the issue.
For (Smith, 1991 and Raghavat 1996) the company that issue the new security in public need the investment banking to become their underwriter in return for a commission comprise management fee, underwriting fee and the lastly the selling concession. The compny also must carefully choose their investment banker to become their underwriter, because the good of underwriter will be able this company increase their IPO price (negotiation and discussion between bank and company). One of the criteria is the underwriter must know the company industry, tern of propose offering, potential conflict of interest relating to the investment banker affiliation with the issuer competitor and the ability to the company provide research support after the offering price. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Prospectus Information Initial Public Offering Litigation Risk Underwriter E(i) = β1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β₄X₄ + i. β1 = Intercept, value of I when X2, X3, X4, equal to zero (0). β2 = Changing in i when X2 change with assumption X3, X4, is constant. β3 = Changing in i when X3 change with assumption X2, X4, is constant.#p#分页标题#e# β4 = Changing in i when X4 change with assumption X2, X3, is constant. X2 = Prospectus information X3 = Underwriter X4 = Litigation risk i = Yi error in population. The hypotheses are stated below: H0 = 0, mean has no significant relationship. H1 ≠ 0, mean has significant relationship. Prospectus information H0 = Prospectus information does not significant relationship to IPO H1 = Prospectus information has significant relationship to IPO Underwriter H0 = Underwriter does not significant relationship to IPO H1 = Underwriter has significant relationship to IPO Litigation risk H0 = Litigation risk does not significant relationship to IPO
H1 = Litigation risk has significant relationship to IPO |