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中国证券交易所

时间:2016-02-18 09:37来源:www.ukthesis.org 作者:英国论文网 点击联系客服: 客服:Damien

中国证券交易所
Chinese Stock Exchange


中国股市(CSM)已经产生了大量的国际投资者的兴趣社区。这并不奇怪,因为中国现在是世界上增长最快的经济,因此比美国获得更多的外国直接投资。

然而这种强烈的兴趣受到许多严重的中国股市的风险。事实上,CSM被广泛认为是在亚洲表现最差的股票交易所。在中国经济和特殊的改革进程的更广泛的背景下构成本研究的核心目标是识别和解释这些风险。

这个研究论文分为五个部分。第一部分概述了中国股市;有效地概述其起源,短暂的的历史和定义的结构。以下部分介绍了最好的材料和在CSM的信息来源。第三部分提供了更广泛的信息和分析中国经济,尤其是在区域直接对CSM的性能的影响。

这里的理由是,中国股市(和风险)不能完全理解,没有一个清晰的评估中国商业实践和经济结构。第四部分介绍了“效率市场假设”(EMH)的概念,并据此评估中国股市的表现。其认为,普遍共识,CSM符合弱式效率状态是正确的。最后一节简要讨论了获得的最好的研究方法主要在CSM和质量信息及其相关的风险。

最后一节还包含采访在伦敦的中国领先的商业咨询公司分析师。其中包含的问题调查是为了给学生一个洞察的难题需要的权威专家。同时有效市场假说的相关问题,妥善解决在这项研究中加入WTO的风险,在整个研究论文后者部分一致引用这些主题。

Risks in Chinese Stock Exchange——中国证券交易所的风险


The Chinese stock market (CSM) has generated a lot of interest in the international investor community. This is hardly surprising given the fact that China is currently the fastest growing economy on earth and consequently receives more direct foreign investment than even the United States.

However this intense interest is tempered by the many serious risks that are associated with the Chinese stock market. Indeed the CSM is widely recognised as the worst performing stock exchange in Asia. Identifying and explaining these risks in the wider context of the Chinese economy and peculiar reform process constitute the core objectives of this study.

This research paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides an overview of the Chinese stock market; effectively outlining its origins, brief history and defining structures. The following section introduces some of the best materials and sources of information on the CSM. The third section provides information and analysis on the wider Chinese economy, especially on areas that directly impact on the performance of the CSM.

The rationale here is that the Chinese stock markets (and the risks associated with them) cannot be fully understood without a broader assessment of Chinese commercial practices and economic structures. The fourth section introduces the concept of “Efficiency Market Hypothesis” (EMH) and assesses the performance of the Chinese stock markets accordingly. Its argued here that the widely held consensus that CSM conforms to weak-form efficiency status, is correct. The final section briefly discusses some of the best research methods for gaining primary and quality information on the CSM and its associated risks.

The last section also contains an interview with a China analyst at leading commercial consultancy in London. The questions contained in the survey are designed to give the student an insight into the kind of difficult questions that need to be put to leading experts. Whilst questions relating to EMH, risks and WTO accession are properly addressed in the latter sections of this study, consistent references to these themes are made throughout this research paper.

The core premise of this research paper is that the Chinese stock exchanges reflect some of the worst features of Chinese commercial practices and economic structures and very few of the decent ones. Consequently the CSM is not a representative of the broader Chinese economy, which despite many of its structural flaws, is now generally recognised as one of the most dynamic in the world.

Chinese Stock Markets——中国股市

Contrary to widespread belief, the Chinese stock markets predate their official formation in Shanghai in 1990 by several years. In fact informal markets in company stocks were prevalent in the early 1980’s. In January 1985 Shanghai Yanzhong made the first public offering of standardised corporate equity in China. The following yearning-markers were established in Shanghai and Shenyang, but they lacked the power to restrain rogue speculation and curb trading. Given the sheer scale of the problem, it is possible to hypothesize that black markets in Chinese stocks may have become prevalent at least 10 years prior to this development.

The first decisive move towards establishing a formal and centralised stock market was made in early 1990, when the reformist leader DEng Xiaoping inaugurated the Shanghai stock exchange. In fact the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets formally began operations in December 1990. By all standards of comparison the formal establishments of stock markets in China came very late in the day. Even developing countries like Pakistan and Indonesia had set up stock markets decades before the Chinese. Nonetheless the very fact of a nominally socialist country establishing stock exchanges, were in itself a remarkable event and attested to the serious resolve on the part of the senior echelons of the communist party, to reform the Chinese economy.

Any serious discussion on the structural flaws and shortcomings of them must be set in the context of its brief 14 year history. But even this history is misleading, since the Chinese stock markets(essentially composed of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges) did not begin to assume real regulatory powers until the middle of the1990’s. Indeed in their early years both markets were beset by extraordinarily high levels of uncertainty and volatility.

The main problems in the early years were the markets’ vulnerability vies-à-virtue government’s economic policies. For instance the markets boomed and consequently suffered badly in the period 1993-1995, at the height of the government’s anti-inflationary campaigns. Moreover the central government regularly intervened in the early years to limit the issuance of stocks.

In the early years the Chinese government seemed to have been less than convinced of the importance of vibrant and dynamic stock markets to a liberalising economy. The government was more preoccupied with managing the privatisation process and developing free trade areas, than thinking strategically about the role of the embryonic stock markets. Indeed the markets’ economic value was dismissed on the grounds that they were purely speculative in nature.

The initial configuration and categorisation of shares—which persists to this day almost unchanged—reflect the central government’s preference for control and over-regulation. Indeed one of the distinctive features of CSM is that shares are defined and limited by their categorisation. In other words once a share has been categorised, it is very difficult to transform it into another share type. This can only be done with the explicit permission of the “China Securities Regulatory Commission” (CSRC). The share types that were devised by the central government in the early 1990’s fall into six categories. These are: A-shares, B-shares, Legal person shares, State shares, H-shares and Red Chips.

The most important shares are the A and B categories. Broadly speaking the former category are reserved for Chinese citizens(i.e. foreigners cannot—as a general rule—acquire these shares) and conversely the latter are designed for foreign ownership. The terms “legal person shares” and “state shares” are essentially designed to determine the private-public balance of share ownership. This is also advice employed by the Chinese government to deny that its stock markets legitimise wholesale privatisation. Of course in real terms, these idiosyncrasies constrain free commerce and make it difficult to fully identify asset ownership. H-shares refers to mainland registered companies listed in Hong Kong and Red-Chips belong to companies registered and listed abroad but which nonetheless have substantial Chinese interests and are at least partly controlled by the Chinese government.

The complexity of this share-categorisation system is, first and foremost, driven by the peculiar characteristics of the Chinese economy and the central government’s strategic policy of reforming it incrementally. In short it is a form of control, but nonetheless—given the overall configuration of the Chinese economy—it is difficult to imagine viable Chinese stock markets without at least some of these controls, in the foreseeable future. This system reflects the fact that even to this day many of the companies listed on CSM are classed as “State Owned Enterprises” (SOE’s) and are thus ultimately controlled either by the regional governments or the central government in Beijing.

This is not to deny that the Chinese authorities have taken steps to enhance the “private” dimension of CSM, but merely to state that taking into account “private” interests was not a major consideration for those who initially planned and constructed Chinese stock markets. Andes it has been argued already, many of the foundational structures offs (for instance the rigid forms of share categorisation) persist to this day.(责任编辑:anne)



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